Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy has entailed the substitution of new income support instruments for the former price based instruments, mainly in the cash crop sector. Our first point is that the domestic political balance was unable to generate such a large change in policy design, in spite of inefficiencies and inbalances. The pressure of the US has been a major factor in the design of the reform. We argue that trade interests have been crucial to catalyze international collective action in order to countervail domestic pressure groups. The pursuit of an agreement in the GATT is therefore a means to place a cap on the CAP and foster some reform and control over sectors such as sugar and dairy in other countries. We do not foresee the disappearance of sources of tensions between the two countries, as EC animal products become more competitive and as the working of the CAP in the vicinity of world prices will make trade flows sensitive to world macro-economic and agricultural shocks. The Uruguay Round, should not be considered as fully satisfactory, and the long-run objective of further decoupling of payments from production incentives should be pursued.
INTRODUCTION
The last ten years have witnessed a substantial reevaluation of agricultural policies in developed countries. The launching of the Uruguay Round and the insistence that agricultural issues be dealt with, under the pressure of the United States (US) and other net exporters of temperate zone products, has created an environment for debate and action. The European Community's (EC) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been the main target of attack that has resulted in EC-US conflict with hot and cool moments according to the stages of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and  Trade) negotiations and to the various negotiation tactics employed in the Urugay Round.
The present paper focuses on the interpretation of the CAP reform in the context of the Uruguay Round and the EC-US agricultural trade conflict. The questions addressed are first to explain why agriculture has, for the first time, been given such a central role and why the CAP reform has developed in the way we have witnessed, tackling firmly the cash crop programs and leaving nearly untouched the most protected dairy and sugar sectors. Our main point is that changes in comparative advantages and the existence of big trade interests in cash crops, organized by the main player, i.e., the United
States, was the main force to circumvent the otherwise dominant special interest forces in favor of the status quo. This explains convincingly the actual design of the CAP reform and even the changes brought to the Commission projects by the EC Council.
The second point is that the GATT framework provides to the competitive exporters a means to constrain the CAP in the future. But, because the GATT is based on general principles and should not be commodity specific, the accord has to be stated more generally and should accordingly force all countries to reform their own highly protected and less competitive subsectors. The GATT would therefore put a cap on the CAP and on other protectionist farm policies, as well.
However, all countries try to minimize the political cost of adjustment, and reforms of the CAP and of other policies still leave a lot of room for payments to be too tied to production incentives, at the expense of environmental amenities. Will the GATT be able to tame and reorient farm policies in the socially desirable directions?
Section 2 briefly reviews the historical EC-US trade debate. Section 3 deals with the EC-US special interests and trade conflicts, Section 4 analyses the CAP reform implications on the EC-US relations and relates it to the expected GATT treaty. Section 5 addresses more long-run issues, stressing the shortcomings of the CAP reform and future prospects for the GATT as a framework to discipline domestic and trade farm policies, including their environmental dimensions.
THE EC-US AGRICULTURAL CONFLICT
The history and the role of agriculture in the GATT shows that the successive Rounds of negotiations were dominated by EC-US disputes. Several The composition of bilateral trade flows in agricultural products is however quite different (Figure 2 .2). The US exports to the EC essentially basic commodities (grains, oilseeds products and corn by-products) which are heavily regulated in both the EC and the US with a generally higher level of protection granted in the EC, except for corn by-products. EC exports to the US include more processed food products with a high value added per ton. For the most part, they are non-CAP commodities, such as wine and beer. Meat and dairy products are also exported. The latter are supported in the EC, but they are also subject to strict trade barriers in the US. US eqxwb to Um EC C/6 mIllion 1 ECapubtofhoUS4434m8txmt
Sources: from USDA,Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, 1992.
The sources of the trade tensions between the EC and the US have originated in both the bilateral trade interests and in the competition for outlets in third countries. The latter source has taken momentum with the increasingly net exporting position of the EC.
The major concern of the US has always been to alleviate or reverse the consequences of the CAP on trade,in cereals and related feed stuffs. The US was in favor of European Integration, but has never really accepted the creation of the customs union and the subsequent principles of the CAP. The issue at stake is the high protection in the EC for grains which first reduced potential US outlets for these products in the EC and made it necessary for the EC to protect other sectors too. Moreover, the use of the variable levy -restitution system, compared to a "gate on a dam" by the US Agriculture Secretary Freeman, was constantly criticized by the US and other exporters as being in contradiction with the GATT principles. In the Kennedy Round, the US wanted to modify the variable levy system, and in the Tokyo Round she wanted levies considered as non-tariff measures and treated accordingly. The US did not get preferential access to the EC for grains in negotiations following the first enlargement of the EC, but did so in 1986 after the accession of Spain and Portugal. subsidies. In the Tokyo Round, the code for subsidies attempted to reinforce
Article XVI with the "concept of an equitable share of world export", but the implementation of this vague limit did not prevent a rapid growth of EC grain exports. The US has become increasingly frustrated by these developments which explain its insistence on a separate negotiation on export subsidies in the Uruguay Round.
Two other major trade concerns of the US, namely oilseeds and corn by-products, are indirectly determined by the EC grain policy. The EC conceded a bound zero tariff on oilseeds products in the XXIV-6 Negotiation, on corn germ meal in 1962 and on corn gluten feed in the Kennedy Round in 1967. These concessions have proved over time to make it increasingly difficult for the EC to pursue its high grain price policy. First, the EC wanted to increase its capacity to produce oilseeds in order to reduce dependence on imports, a policy triggered by the US soybean embargo and the peak world prices of 1972-74.
Oilseeds production in the EC has been stimulated by a price support and by a crushing subsidy mechanism (which works broadly as deficiency payments).
This mechanism has proved to be very costly as production increased sharply.
Increased production was further enhanced by the slowly diminishing support given to grains as a reaction to excess supply. As a result, the cost of the oilseeds program has risen to 3.4 billion ECU in 1990. Policy reform that entails a dismantling of this structure, particularly after it has been in place for an extended period of time, is often questioned on the grounds that it will expose the sector to the vagaries of the market without mechanisms in place to help farmers insure against future contingencies. This structure too has a vested interest in sustaining the status 2 Petit provides an insightful discussion of some of the earlier determinants of agricultural policies in the US and the EC while Josling et al discuss some of the more current factors influencing the direction of policy.
quo I while at the same time making process. Consequently I it has strong control over the public decision it and its vested interests tend to dampen internal motivation for reform, while at the same time, increasing the difficulty from those outside the structure to induce reforms 3 .
Several economic factors also provide agricultural interests with political influence beyond their relative number in the population.
First, the cost of policy that supports incomes in agriculture tends to be dispersed over the entire economy while the benefits are concentrated on a few. As Olson (1965) has suggested, because farmers are small in number relative to a country's population, they have two major advantages. Their small number decreases their individual costs of arranging a group consensus to seek legislation in their favor and their specialization in one or two major activities allows them to earn per capita benefits from support which far exceed the per capita costs incurred by consumers and taxpayers. Hence, since food accounts for a small proportion of total household expenditures, producer groups tend to be more motivated to expend resources to achieve their more narrow political interests than consumers and taxpayers are in general willing to countervail these forces.
Second, due to the uncertain and cyclical nature of agricultural markets caused by climatic, macroeconomic and world trade shocks, agricultural support is often introduced in the presence of upturns in the macroeconomic business cycle. But, it tends to be only marginally withdrawn during downturns in the cycle and its is generally increased during periods of macroeconomic uncertainty (Paarlberg, 1989) . Part of the reason is that agricultural production is characterized by sector specific resources such as land, buildings and equipment that cannot be easily reallocated to other sectors during cyclical downturns in the agricultural economy. Consequently, the value of these resources can fall precipitously during decreasing cycles or lag behind the upturns in the macroeconomic economy, all of which places the welfare of rural households, financial institutions supplying credit to the sector and variable input suppliers at some, risk relative to the overall economy. This risk invariably induces reason that support is only partially withdrawn appears to lie in the fact that just as cyclical downturns affect the value of these resources, so do too the very economic policies designed to avert these effects on their value. That is, the value of agriculture's sector specific assets embody the implicit value bestowed upon them by the instruments themselves 4 . Hence, when economic conditions improve, policies tend to remain in place. Producers are aware of the linkage between the value of sector specific resources and economic support. They are aware of the potential decline in value if support is withdrawn and therefore they have an incentive to engage in political actions to avert this eventuality. Hence, policies designed to offset the effects of uncertainty and cycles in the economy tend to turn into permanent support.
A third closely related incentive to maintain support after a cyclical downturn is that the increased value of the sector specific resources that support causes also provide incentives for capital deepening in land improvements, buildings, equipment and so on. Since this capital deepening is induced by support, the returns to this new capital is dependent on maintaining support. Together, these two effects provide incentives for the racheting up of economic support for agriculture.
Fourth, agriculture is often associated with environmental amenities, rural development and to natural resources. It appears that the economic support to the producers of agricultural commodities is easily confused with support for rural development, support for the country life in general and the environment in particular, the more so as these amenities are public goods without a collectively organized constituency to promote their supply at the socially desirable level.
And fifth, food is closely associated with security (an alleged reason for Japan's support of her rice producers), and health, particularly in the form of food safety. Food safety can easily serve as a justification for non-tariff barriers and extensive regulation.
The culmination of these various factors tends to provide some sectors in agriculture with more political power to influence policy in their favor than others. Johnson et al. (1993) obtained empirical estimates of these relative influences for the US and the EC based on data from 1986, while another study has reaffirmed these approximate magnitudes using data from 1990. Sugar and dairy interests in both the US and the EC exhibited the most influence, followed by producers of animal feeds and grains. Taxpayers (as reflected by the budget costs of agricultural programs) and consumers had the least influence. The influence of beef, pork and poultry producers tended to rank higher in the EC than in the US. Hence, from an interest group perspective alone, it is not surprising that, i) reform is likely to be more difficult to obtain in the sugar and dairy sectors of either the EC or the US relative to the grain sector and, ii) if reform is to be obtained, some form of compensatory payments will surely be required. It is also apparent that acceptance of the GATT principles for agriculture, even if reform is modest, will be an important disciplinary cap to the influence of these interest groups.
The nature of interdependencies between the agricultural economies of the major players
The interdependent effects of EC-US agricultural policies are fairly well known. Effectively, the various studies are in general agreement that the own effects of policy reform are greater than the indirect effects of reform in the EC (US) on the agricultural economy of the US (EC). For example, the results of Johnson et al. (1993) suggest that if the US reforms while the EC follows the status quo, the world prices of wheat and coarse grains, milk and milk by-products, and sugar rise while the prices of animal feed concentrates (oil cakes and vegetable proteins), pork and poultry tend to fall. If the EC reforms while the US follows the status quo, the world prices of wheat and coarse grains, milk and milk by-products, and sugar also tend to rise, as do the prices of beef. The prices of animal feed concentrates, and pork and poultry tend to fall. However, changes in domestic prices and quantities produced always tend to be greater from own reform than from indirect effects of reform in the other country. As a consequence, federal budget savings, the decline in producer quasi rents, the increase in consumer surplus and the net social gains in either the US or the EC are always greater for own policy reform than from the indirect effects of EC (US) reform on the US (EC). Since grains are the major traded commodities for the US and for many members of the Cairns Group of countries, the greatest interdependence lies in the grain sector which in turn impacts on animal feeds, beef and pork a n d poultry. To exporters, this interdependence in grains has of course been the major cause for frustration with the CAP's variable levies, export subsidies and other policies that distorted the EC grain sector. In turn, the EC's commitment in the Dillon Round to bound tariffs on soybeans and meals at zero caused a large divergence in the relative feed grain -protein concentrate price ratios faced in the Community relative to the US, and hence a disadvantageous cost structure for her livestock sector.
In another study, Mahe and Roe (1993) Whether the incentives for reform are sufficient to trigger action at the national level depends in part on the prospects that a country can internalize the gains from reform. The Most Favored Nation principle that the benefit of a concession made by any country must be extended to all other contracting parties is akin to a concession being a public good. When a large number of countries are involved, and/or when they have approximately equal world market shares of the traded good, the incentive is reduced for an individual country to make a concession in return for a concession from another since the benefits of such concessions must be shared by all, i.e., the free-rider problem.
This may be a partial explanation for the failure of the group of small and numerous countries that are low cost producers of sugar to obtain reform of US and EC sugar policies. 
Summary
The major conclusion is that domestic and international forces appear sufficiently strong to explain why reform under the GATT and the CAP is to occur primarily in the grain sector and to some extent in the livestock sector through the feed grain-concentrate linkage. While there is more to the story, note that the domestic forces for reform of the CAP discussed above, the mentioned political influence in the grains being small relative to sugar and dairy, the major interdependencies between US and EC policies occurring However, these pressures were not sufficient to counter those seeking to maintain or increase protection so as to produce a reform of the magnitude and of the market-oriented type we have witnessed.
. EC-US AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS AND THE GATT ROUND:
A "CAP" ON THE CAP Within Commission circles, the CAP reform was officially presented as a separate process from the GATT negotiations. We have argued that the eventual features included in the reform package reveal a major effort to soothe anticipated international pressures on specific trade issues. This is illustrated by the sizeable positive effects of the CAP reform on US agricultural policy objectives. Our analysis (Table  4 .2) suggests that the strict implementation of the Dunkel compromise in the EC would not have provided larger benefits to the US than those from the CAP reform. In this light, the continuing conflict to conclude the Round can be seen as an effort by the grain exporters to bring the CAP under the discipline of the GATT as a guarantee that future CAP developments be constrained more than in the past and as an assurance that the CAP reform would be more effective, i.e., a cap on the CAP. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, applying the discipline of the GATT to agriculture on a multilateral basis would also serve to countervail those interests in sectors of agriculture, such as sugar and dairy in the US and to reform these sectors as well.
CAP reforms, world prices and implications for future EC-US Trade Conflicts
The implications of the CAP reforms on the US arise from at least three sources : : i) changes in US exports to the EC, ii) expected US gains in export volume to the Rest of the World as a result of reduced EC competition, and iii) some terms of trade gains on grain exports. The analyses of these linkages are based on MISS (Guyomard and Mahe, 1993) . MISS is a price equilibrium model that focuses in detail on the structure of US and EC agriculture and agricultural policy, extended to include a simplified "Rest of the Economy" supplying inputs to the farm sector at near infinitely elastic supply so that prices of inputs supplied by the non farm sector are led by the inflation rate. Technological change, growth trends in population and per capita incomes, and other variables exogenous to the agricultural sector are factored into the analysis.
World Prices
The base-run scenario corresponds to a "continuation of the pre-reform" CAP.
The results suggest that nearly all prices decline moderately in real terms.
Prices of grains, of oilseeds and particularly of grain substitutes decrease most. The only significant exception is beef which exhibits price increases in nominal and real terms due to a lower rate of technical change and a higher income elasticity than other food products. These results depend on the assumptions made regarding the evolution of the mentioned exogenous variables.
They also depend on the changes in EC price support policies in the base-run.
There is room for debate here, and alternative assumptions could be The same reason explains why world dairy prices are the same in the two CAP reform scenarios. It is also noticeable that the discrepancies in world prices between the actual and the decoupled CAP reforms fade over time and almost disappear at the end of the decade.
In the "Blair House" or GATT scenario, where the pre-accord is implemented in the EC only, the picture of world price effects is generally not much different, except for grains and feeds. World prises are lower in this GATT scenario because no set aside is imposed on the arable land in the EC and only a limited cut in producer price is mandatory to meet the 20 % reduction in AMS and the 36 % tariff equivalent cut. The user price of grains in the EC has to be fully aligned on the world price since exports overshoot the allowed quantity of subsidized exports. Consequently, the EC is running large deficiency payments in grains, exporting at world prices but much more than under the actual CAP reform scenario and, of course, much more than under the nearly free trade decoupled CAP reform scenario. Lower cereal and feed grain prices also drive world prices of proteins and grain by-products further down, but only to a small extent.
To sum up, the overall picture of world price changes due to the three EC scenarios is that the major impact of the decoupled reform is to moderately improve world grain prices. In the CAP reform scenario, prices of oilseeds are a little below the level of the base-run scenario, but it is not the case in the decoupled reform. Corn gluten feed prices are driven down sharply in the two reform scenarios, and more so in the actual reform simulation. The prices of animal products are also raised by the reform projects, but only in 1996 for pork and poultry prices which are thereafter heavily influenced by EC and world grain prices. In our representation, target prices of grains are exogenous but loan rates follow the trends of world prices. The loan rate on soybeans is treated in the same way 6 . Market prices of pork and poultry, and of corn gluten feed also follow world prices. For dairy 7 , beef and sugar, domestic prices are pegged in nominal terms, and therefore they decrease by the rate of inflation in real terms.
The effects of the three EC reform scenarios on the US are summarized in Table 4 .2. The main observation is that, except for budget costs and trade balance on grains, the difference between the various EC reform scenarios is significant, but not huge in spite of the noticeable discrepancies in world prices highlighted previously.
Under the base-run scenario in the EC, terms of trade for US exports would deteriorate. The export value of grains would be 1.5 billion ECU (in 1993 ECU) lower in 1999 than in 1990. Net exports of oilseeds (and products) and of corn gluten feed would continue to grow slightly in value.
As expected, the actual CAP reform appears attractive to the US. With respect to the base-run, better world prices for grains reduce the US budget costs for grains by 1.2 billion ECU (in 1996) and net exports of grains are 6 An alternative solution could be to peg the loan rates according to the principle of marketing loans, but the loan rates themselves may be adjusted by policy makers. 0.6 billion higher in value. The only minor adverse effects are due to the loss of oilseeds (and products) and corn gluten feed export value because of the 21 declining feed demand from the EC animal sector. 8 The US income indicator mainly reacts to world prices of grains, oilseeds and pork and poultry. There is no distinction between participants and nonparticipants in the US grain program, and therefore, no benefit from higher world prices on US grain producers is represented in the model. Incomes are negatively affected by higher world grain prices. Thus, the positive effect of the CAP reform on US incomes is probably underestimated. A dollar appreciation would clearly enhance the probability of this course of events, but the rise of corn and feed grain prices in the EC, due to low self sufficiency after the CAP reform, would for some time retard this process.
The trend in world grain prices would also change the fundamentals of EC grain exports. The management of restitutions will be more subject to world price shocks as the necessary level of subsidization becomes low or zero. The EC could then target more precisely her restitutions, as the US does now, on specific markets to be contested or preserved.
Altogether, the likely picture of EC imports and exports in the grain and feed area is clearly moving toward more instability in prices, subsidies and trade flows. The macroeconomic factors worldwide, and in both the EC (through the working of the European Monetary System and the switch over) and in the US (exchange rates), will be essential elements of agricultural trade. Because of the likely shocks and ratchet effects on flows due to changing price relations, conditions are prepared for a pursuit of conflicts between the two big players. Even the signing of a Peace Clause is not likely to overcome the potential trade conflicts created by the fundamentals. Still, they are not satisfied with this unilateral reform because past experiences seem to have taught them that the EC is unable to timely adjust price support levels to technical change and world market conditions in a manner that precludes a loss in their market shares. Hence, their response to this reform suggests that it does not provide the guarantees that the disciplines of the GATT will apply. This is likely why the US and the Cairns Group firmly rejected the EC negotiating position that specific commitments on trade policies were unnecessary because they would result automatically from the cut in internal support. This is one of the reasons for the US proposals to have included specific and often different commitments on various trade barriers 9 . Therefore, two areas of negotiation were added to the PSE-AMS approach which had a more central role in the early than in the later stages of the Round. This is at variance with the expectation that the AMS would play an important role, when for the first time, domestic policies were supposed to be scrutinised in the negotiation process and then disciplined by the GATT.
The post mid-term US proposals (1989, 1990 ) focused on tariffication and export competition, insisting that export subsidies should be reduced at a faster pace than import barriers. Moreover, the concept of tariffication was also aiming at the elimination of the long denounced variable levy-restitution system. The discrimination against export subsidization was justified by the GATT general principles but put a disproportionate burden of adjustment on the EC as compared to the US for example (Guyomard and Mahe, 1991) .
The lack of confidence among the more competitive exporters in the unilateral CAP reform is further illustrated by the introduction of a new concept in commitments, i.e., the obligation of results in trade liberalization. Hence, the introduction of the concept of minimum access to imports and the specified reduction in subsidized export quantities included in the Dunkel compromise. These elements are clearly aimed at countering the temptation of the EC to maintain a sizeable exporting activity based on subsidization and to further enhance self-sufficiency in the remaining importing sectors. In discipline the
Even if between the two reform process other words, the GATT Round was seen as an opportunity to EC decision making and to "put a cap on the CAP".
the Uruguay Round has often appeared as a "combat des chefs" economic giants, it is also true that multilateralization of the was a way to promote positive-externalities in the reform 9 Another reason includes the attempt to minimize adjustment protected sectors (CARD, 1991) . in the process.
Most studies (e.g. OECD, 1987, Johnson et al., . ..) suggest that joint liberalization increases world prices. For most developed countries, this would reduce the cost of adjustment or increase the benefits of net exporters due to further improvements in terms of trade. Hence, the efforts of the US and the Cairns countries to continue the multilateral process.
4.3. The GATT is also a means to help so-called fair traders do some housekeeping at home
The process of negotiating a treaty for agriculture under GATT principles requires that negotiators reach agreement on rules. These rules, however, cannot be commodity specific even if strategies were clearly designed so as to maximize other countries concessions while minimizing own concessions. 10 The rules, tailored according to this strategy, must be in line with the GATT philosophy of reducing import barriers and especially the reduction of subsidies to exports that up to now were tolerated under article XVI.
Rules, as they are specified in the Draft Final Act, are complex and their differences according to instruments reflect the strategies of the various countries to capture trade gains at minimum political cost. Still, the protected sectors (sugar, dairy) should not escape the obligation of adjustment in the future. This is how the compromise will impose a revision of the CAP reform in a direction more consistent with the first Commission proposals and will help to reduce price support in the dairy and sugar sectors. Eventually enlarging the cap on the CAP. This change in the political balance of domestic forces between reform supporters and opponents will also extend to the countries who have a tendency to present themselves as free traders, but who nonetheless have highly protected sectors that they have been unable to reform.
Again, the US is probably the best example of this case as illustrated by the 10 There is ample evidence that most delegations have followed that route. Canada is an example when it strived to get production quotas treated in a more lenient fashion than other price support policies without supply control. The US is another case in point when the choice of the reference period for the AMS reduction is clearly designed to minimize support cuts under this rule. Japan is the extreme case in that respect, but the EC's reluctance to accept specific commitments on subsidized exports is another example of this general attitude. in specific commodities were sufficient to induce it to seek an effective result in this Round.
LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES OF EC-US TRADE
The CAP remains on the whole inefficient and inequitable to consumers and taxpayers, and to selected farmers whose incomes are supported unevenly. The main motivation for farm support in the EC is the existing low remuneration to resources, labor in particular, invested in farming. Consequently, in the long term, intersectoral mobility of resources is the natural remedy for low agricultural incomes, and policy makers should find ways of facilitating this transfer at the least social cost. A proper long-term policy favoring resource mobility and structural adjustment in agriculture is then essential to reduce in the future justified claims for public support. Consequently, long-term perspectives on the EC-US agricultural trade will be largely dependent on the impact of CAP reform on the farm structure.
Conflicting Objectives:
Structural impact of EC common and national policies The traditional CAP has been focusing on price support, without a strategy for structural adjustment. The Guidance section of EAGGF has always accounted for less than 5% of the fund, even though, according to the initial views of EC policy makers, its size should have been at least one third of common expenditure in agriculture. Structural policy has been left to the initiative of member states, whose main concerns were focused on safeguarding farm incomes and adequate levels of agricultural employment.
As a result, farm structure in the EC, which was quite uneven before the institution of the EC, has failed to become more homogeneous. In northern countries, farm structures have moderately improved along with labor productivity.
In southern countries, farm structures have improved at a much lower rate and labor productivity is still very low. Notwithstanding considerable rates of labor out migration (e.g., in Italy and Spain), farm structure did not change substantially, and a large number of inefficient farms are still present together with a smaller number of larger and more competitive farms. In fact, the declared objective of some national policies has been to keep a large number of working people in agriculture. For example, the objectives of the Italian "Piano Agricolo Nazionale" are, i) to support and increase farm incomes, and ii) to safeguard agricultural employment especially for young people, and in less developed regions.
These objectives of the Italian agricultural policy are clearly hindering the intersectoral mobility of resources, and of labor in particular. This may help to explain why Italy, although importing almost one fifth of its food needs, accounts for a labor share in total employment in terms of Annual Work Units (AWU's) which is still double or triple that of other EC countries enjoying approximately the same level of economic development, such as The Netherlands and Belgium.
Unfortunately, in the EC as a whole, the distribution of farms per class of farmer's income is more similar to Italy than to the Dutch. Family farm income per AWU in half of EC farms is still less than 5000 ECU per year, not withstanding the substantial price and income support granted by the CAP. This may explain, to a certain extent, the more liberal approach of Dutch policy makers and farmers unions regarding the GATT negotiations as compared to the more conservative positions held by some other member states.
This excess labor retained in agriculture, especially in the less developed regions, is likely to be the combined effect of both the EC price support policy and the pseudo-structural policies implemented at the national level. The invisible nature of most income transfers to farmers was disguising the real contribution of agricultural employment to social welfare ll .
The 1992 CAP reform, by substituting explicit direct subsidies for invisible market transfers, substantially increased the transparency of the social payers sector productivity of farm labor, not only as perceived by consumers and tax but also as understood by farmers. To the contrary, in the dairy subwhere production quotas were introduced in 1984, the existing level of transparency has been further reduced, hindering the intersectoral mobility of resources and structural adjustment.
Long-term effects of the CAP reform
The long-term effects of the CAP reform are obviously very important in order to understand whether it will effectively contribute to solving the farm problems and favor a more efficient international allocation of resources, or whether it will be a palliative aiming at maintaining present economic rents in some farms and regions together with inefficient farm structures in other regions. "Gattopardismo" has been very frequent in past CAP reforms.
The EC Council of Ministers on May 1992 decided that the compensation of farmers for income losses due to reduced price support should be paid on a year to year basis. This decision is likely to have the following consequences:
i) The administrative costs of computing compensations and validating farmer's annual declarations will be a major burden on EC and national budgets, with wider possibilities for fraud.
11 Social security invisible transfers were substantial, accounting for more than 50% of public expenditure in agriculture in early eighties. Altogether, income transfer to agriculture was approximately equal to the sectoral value added (Tarditi and Croci-Angelini, 1988, p. 28 and 70) . Unfortunately, the survey on national expenditure in agriculture (CEC, 1982) initiated by the EC Commission in the early eighties, and providing extremely interesting information, was never updated.
ii) It would not be advisable to modulate compensation according to farm size in the case where they are paid yearly without running the risk of hindering structural adjustment while they install incentives to meet the conditions to maximize payments.
Maintaining smaller and less efficient farms would mean receiving every year higher compensations.
iii) Farmers running small holdings will be encouraged to remain in the agricultural sector in order to receive their payments, thus limiting the intersectoral and intersectoral labor mobility. Group (LUFPIG) of the European Parliament. (Marsh et al., 1991) If a lump-sum compensation, for the reduction in incomes is computed for 12 The LUFPIG proposal at the European Parliament envisioned a 15 year period. The same period has been assumed for a simulation of the impact of a decoupled CAP reform on markets and prices (Folmer et al., 1993 iv) Labor mobility out of agriculture would not be hindered.
v) Farmers' incomes would not be tied directly to policy makers. The spending for lobbying would be reduced and farmers would be more reliant on actual market prices.
Although accepting its economic advantages, these decoupled aspects of a bolder CAP reform may be considered too risky by policy makers whose concerns are focused on possible demographic and territorial problems. Lump-sum compensations could then be tested on a specific section of the agricultural sector, e.g., providing this extra choice only to smaller, economically nonviable farms, or limiting lump sum compensations to specific EC regions where agricultural employment is clearly excessive. Such a scheme would favor the needed structural adjustment. Complementary measures for restructuring farms in these areas and fostering economic development in other economic sectors are also clearly necessary to promote regional and rural development on a wider economic basis than the agricultural sector alone.
CONCLUSION
The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy has amounted to the substitution of new income support instruments for the usual price policy, essentially in the cash crop sector. Our first point is that the domestic political balance was unable to generate such a large change in policy design, in spite of inefficiencies and imbalances due to the traditional CAP. The pressure of the US has been a major factor in the evolution of the reform. We argue that trade interests have been crucial to catalyze international collective action in order to counteract domestic pressure groups. Apparently, the reform satisfies the US objectives as well as the GATT compromise. The US gains from the CAP reform are noticeable, but we do not foresee the disappearance of sources of tension between the EC and the US, as EC animal products become more competitive and as the working of the CAP in the vicinity of world prices will make trade flows sensitive to agricultural and macro-economics shocks.
According to some quantitative estimates 13 , which are consistent with ours, the expected effect of a decoupled CAP reform on trade flows between the EC and the US should not be too dramatic as a whole. The increased extensification related to a larger number of economically viable farms will likely be balanced by reduced land set-aside, improving the allocation of resources. developed regions where depopulation could occur and favoring a better income distribution through decoupled policy instruments. However, as domestic special interests, both in the EC and the US, are still very strong, such a completion of the CAP reform is likely to be possible only if external pressures for reform are joined by domestic political pressures from consumers and by a more socially oriented attitude of policy makers (Tarditi, 1993) .
The pursuit of an agreement in the GATT is therefore a means to keep further developments in the CAP under control and to promote the positive externalities from multilateral reform. Hence, the search for a package dressed up along the principles of the GATT and based on trade barriers rather than on effective support reduction. This package has the further benefits of fostering the capability of the proponents of action to actually reform their most protected sectors like sugar and dairy which they were unable to adjust in isolation. The magnitude of changes in these sectors will be limited, but the GATT will put a cap not only on the CAP but also on the support of the protected industries in otherwise agricultural export oriented countries.
It appears that the Uruguay Round will succeed in placing agriculture partly under the GATT. This success is not satisfactory however, and the long-run objective of further decoupling of payments from production incentives should be pursued in order to promote agricultural trade on a more competitive basis and to reserve intervention of the State to the promotion of public goods.
